Bangladesh defeated the Pakistan Army on December 16, 1971, following nine months of liberation warfare. The Bengali leadership had no intention of engaging in an armed conflict. The basis of the independence struggle was the colonisation of Bengalis by Pakistan. The Bengali language, literature, history, and non-communal approach were always denigrated by Pakistan's non-Bengali leaders. Rather, in a multiracial state like Pakistan, they attempted to use religion as a platform for national integration. West Pakistani rulers attempted to make Urdu the official language of Pakistan rather than Bangla, attempted to use Arabic and Roman letters to write Bangla, outlawed Rabindra literature (Tagore's writings), and thus disregarded the Bengali people's millennium-old cultural existence. Bengali interests have always been opposed by the governing class in West Pakistan. A solid political organization did not emerge as a result of those vested interests working together. In its 23-year history, Pakistan was dominated by military figures for 12 years (1958–1970). 

The Muslim League (1947-58) and the Ayub Regime both failed to establish Pakistan as a legitimate democratic state with sound political institutions. Because the majority of East Bengal's educated middle class was Hindu, civil and military services in Pakistan were predominantly Western (International Commission of Jurists, 2017; Mohsin, 2024). Economic prejudice against Bengalis was evident at the time. Over the course of Pakistan's 23-year history, 90% of bank down payments were handled by West Pakistanis, 85% of the country's capital was concentrated in Karachi, 22 West Pakistani families controlled 87% of all non-state funding, and only 10% of all defence spending was made in East Pakistan. Two thirds of Pakistan's exports came from East Pakistan's jute, tea, and other products, but in return, they received less than a third of the country's imports, less than half of its progress funds, and less than a quarter of its foreign aid (International Commission of Jurists, 2017). These divisions between Pakistan's two wings persisted during the Ayub administration, and West Pakistan completely dominated the Bengali population. These factors all had an impact on Pakistan's 1970 election outcomes. 

The Awami League [henceforth AL], a political party that supports Bengalis, won those elections decisively. Regretfully, the rulers of West Pakistan were hesitant to hand over power to the Bengalis. On the evening of March 25, 1971, they began the genocide against defenceless Bengalis. As a result, the situation worsened and the Bengalis were compelled to fight for their independence.

The events leading up to the Bangladesh War of Liberation following the 1970 Pakistani elections are evaluated in this article. This research article will employ a historical basic methodology. The events will be recounted and analysed using a historical timeline. An essential component of this procedure will be an examination of the numerous government publications that the relevant governments released in 1971. 

In this article, these materials will serve as primary sources. At the same time, a range of books and articles will be used as secondary sources.

This article will assist in comprehending Pakistan's complicated and contentious position following the 1970 general election that resulted in its dissolution. It will also expose the deception of West Pakistani politicians, including General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan [henceforth Yahya], the country's president and Martial Law dictator, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto [henceforth Bhutto], the chairman of the Pakistan People's Party [henceforth PPP]. 

Discussion: Events Leading Up to Pakistan's Dissolution (December 1970–March 25, 1971)      

Six-Point Programme and The Elections of 1970 

When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman [henceforth Mujib], the head of the AL, was released from prison on February 21, 1969, following the public uprising, he made it clear that he would accept nothing less than Six Points  Shortly after his release, Bangabandhu [Friend of Bengal] was the title bestowed upon Mujib at a large-scale demonstration that the students planned at the Race Course in Dacca. The meeting had reaffirmed the students' Eleven Points Programme, which was more extreme than the Six Points plan.  Mujib limited his negotiating position with West Pakistanis by accepting the students' demands and choosing to capitalise on the surge of radicalism sparked by their demonstrations over the previous few months (Raghavan, 2013; Haque, 2023).

Ayub's prize protégé was Yahya. Yahya, who had been a young Brigadier when Ayub assumed command of the army, had grown into a reliable ally. He replaced two top contenders for the position when Ayub designated him commander in chief in 1966. On March 13, 1969, during a four-day discussion between the opposition parties and the government, Ayub pledged to hand over authority to the elected members (Rahman, 2009a). Regretfully, Ayub took back his pledge and gave the troops unlawful authority. On March 25, 1969, Ayub was replaced by Yahya. On the same day, Pakistan also proclaimed Martial Law for the second time (Rahman, 2009a). Yahya declared himself both the Chief Administrator of Martial Law and President. However, bureaucrats and carefully chosen civilian advisors appointed a cadre of top officials to lead the government. Lieutenant General Peerzada, the President's Principal Staff Officer; Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid, the Army Chief; Major General Umar, the National Security Council Secretary; Lieutenant General Gul Hasan Khan, the Chief of General Staff; and Major General Mitha, the Quartermaster General, were among the important military figures who participated in the decision-making process. Although they had known Yahya and each other, their connections were not particularly smooth (Raghavan, 2013). Because of all of this, the Martial Law authority was ill-equipped to withstand the challenges that lay ahead.

Yahya issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO) on March 30, 1970, outlining the directives and strategy for draughting a new constitution. The LFO stated that, ‘... the Federal Government shall have adequate powers, including legislative, administrative, and financial powers, to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internal affairs and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country, but the provinces shall have maximum autonomy, that is, maximum legislative, administrative, and financial powers' (Rahman, 2009a). There was a clear clash between the Six Points and the core idea of the LFO. Demands for provincial autonomy, led by Mujib's AL, grew as a result of East Pakistan's history of western economic and political dominance. 

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it became more and more clear that West Pakistan's political and economic interests had consistently trumped those of East Pakistanis. The employment of tariffs, import supervises, industrial licensing, foreign aid buildup, and investment allocation by the central government aided in the growth of high-cost businesses in West Pakistan. The East Pakistan market, which was confined by import quotas and tariff walls, ensured the profitability of these industries. The 1965 India-Pakistan War added the long-standing complaints of economic inequality to the central government's carelessness and disregard for East Pakistan's defence. In this context, the AL's Six Points regional autonomy charter was a set of demands for ending internal colonial authority in West Pakistan and eliminating disparities between the two wings of Pakistan. 

The Six Points proposal to remove restrictions on international aid and trade would undoubtedly deprive the federal government of its rightful authority over foreign affairs. However, Six Points claimed that the federal government would be unable to impose taxes in a straight line, which would allow the provinces to veto its defence Programme. Yahya gave Mujib permission to run the election campaign using the Six Points strategy in light of all those odds and findings. According to Mujib, the next elections ought to be viewed as a Six Points referendum. He claimed that the fight for workers' and peasants' control in the nation was directly related to the fight for autonomy (Raghavan, 2013). West Pakistan's response to the disastrous typhoon that struck on November 12, 1970, which killed hundreds of thousands of people, was slow and indifferent. Mujib called for complete regional autonomy, but he did not interpret his remarks as a call for independence (Raghavan, 2013). 

The PPP did not endorse the Six Points and steered clear of it during the election campaign in West Pakistan. The Council Muslim League [the Muslim League was split into three factions: the Council Muslim League, the Convention Muslim League, and the Quayum's Muslim League] and the National Awami Party [NAP, Wali Khan, pro-Moscow] were among those who favoured complete autonomy for all of Pakistan's provinces (Osmany, 2014).  

From December 7, 1970, to January 17, 1971, Pakistan held open elections to select the lawmakers who would create a constitution and establish democracy. No party could secure a simple majority to form the government, according to Yahya's calculations. Siddiq Salik, Public Relations Officer of the Martial Law Administration in East Pakistan has mentioned in this context, ‘The rise of Mujib's campaign for Bengali nationalism and the gradual fall of his political opponents left little doubt in our minds about the future course of events. It was apparent that Mujib would muster enough support, by the polling date for his six points' (Salik, 1997). In those elections, the AL got the mandate to form the Provincial and Central Government as they bagged 298 out of 310 seats in the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly and 167 out of 169 seats allocated to East Pakistan (167 out of a total of 313) in the National Assembly of Pakistan (Rahman, 2009a). With 88 MPs, the Marxist PPP was the second majority faction in the National Assembly. In Punjab and Sind, it was the dominant party as well. North West Frontier Province was dominated by the Muslim League (Quiyum), while Baluchistan was dominated by the NAP (Wali Khan). The PPP received no seats in East Pakistan, and the AL received none in West Pakistan (Rahman, 2009a). The Bengali's overwhelm-ming victory elicited a hostile response from the PPP and its leader, Bhutto. In a statement released in Lahore on December 20, 1970, he said his PPP would not stand by for another five years to take the National Assembly's opposition seat (Sisson and Rose, 1990).

Awami League's Draft Constitution 

The LFO stated that if the National Assembly was not able to create and pass the constitution within 120 days, it would be dissolved and new elections would have to be held. This clause was supported by the argument that the elected leaders needed to be given a feeling of urgency. However, considering the gaps between the major parties' viewpoints, this clause would allow the regime to exert influence on their journey to the constitutional summit. The LFO further stated that the assembly would dissolve if the President refused to approve the constitution bill once it was submitted to him for verification (Raghavan, 2013). 

The military elite had expected the electorate to provide a split verdict. They believed that a new election would be required since it would be practically impossible to draft a constitution in 120 days with such a split National Assembly. Alternatively, force the politicians to accept the military's position on future political regimes. Without a doubt, the military administration consistently undervalued the PPP and the AL. It is possible that they had no desire to grant the Bengalis governmental authority. The military was equally concerned about how its corporate interests and political stance were presented. Visiting Dacca in late December 1970 a senior General reassured his fellow officers, 'Don't worry … we will not allow those black bastards to rule over us' (Salik, 1997). Three months later, Pakistani military with massive force came down on the Bengalis of East Pakistan.  The AL tried to create a constitution based on the ideas of the Six and Eleven Points in order to forecast the future and the upcoming session of the National Assembly. The committee in charge of draughting was Kamal Hossain. The AL would undoubtedly have more authority under the next constitution because it held a majority in both the province and the centre. Mujib stated that they wanted the cooperation and assistance of the representatives of West Pakistan in draughting the constitution, but that there could be no compromise on basic policy issues during an address at the Race Course on the Programme of the solemn validation of devotion of the newly elected members of the Provincial Assembly and members of the National Assembly belonging to the AL on January 3, 1971 (‘West Pakistan leaders' Co-operation to be Sought'. 1971). An American ambassador claimed that while Mujib was open to compromise on less significant issues, East Pakistan's near economic independence was a deal-breaker. ‘This was the last chance and alternative to acceptance East Pak demands would be civil war,' he cited Mujib as saying (Khan, 1999). Mujib and the Bengalis would prefer to live in peace in one Pakistan, the American ambassador added, but they had run out of patience and had other options (Khan, 1999). Without a doubt, Mujib was hinting at independence by bringing up alternative options. 

The Talk (January 1971) and Yahiya's Bias in Favour of Bhutto

Yahya initially took a favourable stance and failed to see anything gravely offensive in the Six Points. Even though he thought everything was fine, he did not share his thoughts on the future constitution during the first round of negotiations with Mujib in mid-January 1971, instead focussing on the ‘unity and integrity of Pakistan' and the necessity of reaching an agreement with the future opposition party (Rahman, 2009b). They had their first encounter on January 12, 1971. Mujib made it clear that he wanted Yahya to be the next elected president (Sisson and Rose, 1990). On January 14, 1971, Yahya mentioned Mujib as Pakistan's future prime minister when they left Dacca (Choudhury, 2011). Yahya was asked by Mujib to call a National Assembly meeting on February 15, 1971 (Raghavan, 2013). 

The execution of the Six Points was the main source of conflict between the AL and the PPP. During many sessions of the second round of negotiations between the PPP and the AL, which took place from January 27 to 30, Bhutto mainly addressed the indicated Six Points plan. He made no alternative or specific proposals regarding the nature of the future Pakistani Constitution. The AL's firm attitude caught the PPP delegation off guard. 

Therefore, the two sides' disagreements remained unresolved. Before that, on January 17, Bhutto, Lt. General Hamid, Lt. General S. M. Peerzada (Principle Staff Officer to Yahya), Lt. General Umar (Chairman of the National Security Council) and Yahya met at his family's baronial estate. Bhutto didn't waste any time in voicing his disapproval of Yahya's announcement that Mujib would be the future Prime Minister. He said his party would back Yahya's initiatives to keep Pakistan united (Raghavan, 2013). 

One of Mujib's main advisors, Rehman Sobhan, noted in his July 1971 essay in the South Asian Review that the majority of the leaders working on the PPP version of the constitution were attorneys. In spite of their opposition to a Six Points constitution, they had no distinct sets of recommendations, and PPP members differed in their opinions about which Six Points point they objected to and why (Rahman, 2009a). 

In addition to promising to hold additional negotiations when the PPP left Dacca on January 30, 1971, by saying that there was nothing wrong with taking time till at least the end of February, Bhutto adopted a negative position. Bhutto did not explicitly reject Mujib's plan for an early season of the assembly on February 15, 1971 (Rahman, 2009a). On February 6, 1971 Yahya extended an invitation to Mujib to visit Rawalpindi so they could continue discussing constitutional matters. Rather, Mujib extended an invitation to Yahya to visit Dacca. 

The president became enraged with Mujib during a meeting on February 20 and said, ‘I am going to sort out that bastard [Mujib]' (Raghavan, 2013). He then contemplated delaying the National Assembly. ‘So let it be,' he responded when told that this might result in military action (Raghavan, 2013). When Yahya declined Mujib's proposal for the initial session of the parliament on February 15, 1971, and instead held it on March 3, 1971, in accordance with Bhutto's wish, it was clear that he preferred the PPP (Rahman, 2009a).

Seeking US Assistance

After all, Mujib knew that gaining international recognition would be crucial for Bangladesh to become an independent nation. As things worsened, Mujib turned to the United States for assistance in preventing a crisis. Through Alamgir Rahman, the General Manager of ESSO in East Pakistan, Mujib made contact with Archer K. Blood, the US Consul General in Dacca, in early February. Blood was requested by Mujib to weigh in on whether the US could act as a mediator in the event that East Pakistan chose to declare its independence. The US wanted Pakistan to remain a single nation, Blood informed Alamgir. When Alamgir visited Blood once more on February 24, he reported that Mujib had expressed his hope that the Ambassador would be persuaded to serve as a mediator in an attempt to reach a viable constitutional agreement between Bhutto and Mujib. On February 28, 1971, US Ambassador to Pakistan Joseph Farland visited Mujib at his home in Dacca. Mujib stated that he preferred a sort of constitution where instead of being divided, the people of Bangladesh would get their fair portion (Blood, 2002).    

Bhutto's Declaration to Avoid the National Assembly

Three days after conferring with Yahya, Bhutto showed the characteristics of a shaky and avaricious politician when he declared in Peshwar on February 15, 1971, that the PPP would not go to the National Assembly session that started in Dacca on March 3, 1971, unless the AL supported in some way, since they could not go there just to back the party's constitution. Bhutto stated that the PPP will accept the students' ten out of eleven points and the first and last of the Six Points. He disagreed with the Six Points plan's ideas about currency, foreign commerce, taxes, and two subject centres (‘Pakistan People's Party Not to Attend National Assembly Session', 1971). It is clear from the events of January–March 1971 that Bhutto conspired with Yahya (Reza, 1997). Bhutto stated that he thought the Six Points were unfeasible in a conversation with AP correspondent Arnold Zeitlin on February 14. He hinted that there was little chance of Pakistan being united. Additionally, he was certain that the troops would not oppose him (Blood, 2002). Bhutto was as much in need of the Pakistani army's help at the time as they were of his. On February 28, 1971, Mujib responded to Bhutto's announcement by saying that the Six Points Programme would not be forced upon anyone because it had been proposed not only for the Bengalis but also for the people of Punjab, NWFP, Sind, and Baluchistan (‘No Imposition of Six Points', 1971). Bhutto announced that if the assembly's first session went as scheduled on March 3, 1971, he would launch a strike from Peshwar to Karachi. Later, in a statement on April 17, 1971, Tajuddin Ahmed, the General Secretary of the AL, stated that there was proof that Lt. General Umar, the Chairman of the National Security Council and a close ally of Yahya, and Major General Akbar, the Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence, personally pressured several West Pakistani leaders to decline to attend the assembly in order to strengthen Bhutto's hand. (Rahman, 2009b). Before that, on February 26, 27, and 28, 1971, the AL held a meeting to finalise their draft constitution (The International Commission of Jurists, 2017). 

The situation in East Pakistan was nearly at a boiling point by this point. The Bengalis were becoming extremely impatient due to the delay in calling the assembly. In Dacca and the majority of towns, public gatherings, processions, and rallies started to happen day and night. Approximately on February 20, the army started putting together for its option. On February 27, the first reinforcements of troops started to arrive in Dacca.

The Postponement

On March 1, 1971, Yahya again broke his promise by agreeing to Bhutto's request to postpone the assembly without announcing when it would meet again. By indicating the PPP and India, Yahya ‘with a heavy heart' said: 

The position briefly is that the major party of West Pakistan, namely, the Pakistan People's Party, as well as certain other political parties, have declared their intention not to attend the National Assembly session on the third March, 1971. In addition, the general situation of tension created by India has further complicated the whole position. I have, therefore, decided to postpone the summoning of the National Assembly to a later date (Rahman, 2009a).

Former Pakistan Cabinet member G. W. Choudhury, who served from April 1969 to February 1971, wrote the initial text of Yahya's statement. Together with Bhutto, Yahya's Principle Staff Officer, Peerzada, altered it. Nothing could have been more devastating or controversial than Yahya's declaration on March 1, 1971, that the Assembly would be postponed (Choudhury, 2011). It is evident from Yahya's actions that he was exploiting ‘ambitious' Bhutto against the interests of the Bengali people and making fun of her in the guise of parliamentary politics. It seems that while anti-PPP factions negotiated their support for a piece of a central alliance, a two-thirds majority for the AL's constitutional proposal was becoming apparent. Because of this, it took time to form an anti-AL coalition, which was challenging because neither Bhutto nor Yahya had a strong and convincing substitute for the Six Points (Rahman, 2009a).

Non-Co-operation Movement and De Facto Government by The Awami League

The general consensus was that the civil-military bureaucracy that controlled Pakistan's sectarian structure would never allow the rights of Bengalis to be fulfilled. At the time, Mujib was under a lot of strain for obtaining total independence. Mujib, however, believed that they should refrain from doing anything that would enable the government to accuse the AL and therefore defend a military crackdown (Raghavan, 2013). A resolution for Bangladesh's independence was passed and the flag of an independent Bangladesh was raised during a rally on March 2, 1971, in the grounds of the University of Dacca's Faculty of Arts (Osmany, 2014). On the same day, Mujib said that he would speak at a large gathering in the Race Course Maidan [Field] on March 7 at 2:00 PM and would lay out a strategy for the Bengalis to obtain the right to self-determination. ‘Every day from March 3, 1971, to March 6, 1971, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., the province-wide Hartal shall be observed in all areas, including government offices, secretariats, the High Court and other courts, semi-government and autonomous corporations, PIA, railways and other communication services, transport, private and public, all mills, factories, industrial and communal establishments, and markets,' he declared (‘Mujib Strongly Condemns Firing', 1971). On the evening of March 2, Yahya enforced a curfew due to ‘widespread looting, arson, and other lawlessness.' There was also press censorship. Without first contacting the AL, Yahya announced on March 3 that a gathering of party leaders would be held in Dacca on March 10. As the head of the majority party in the national legislature, Mujib was ill-prepared to sit on an equal footing with other party leaders. On March 3, 1971, Mujib issued a series of directions, including a prohibition against paying taxes and a demand for the immediate withdrawal of troops, and he called for a Programme of nonviolent and noncooperation movements (‘Withdrawal Forces and Transfer Power', 1971).

Everyone's hopes were exceeded by the response to Mujib's call. From March 1 to 25, 1971, the people of Bangladesh pushed the boundaries of non-cooperation. Communication and transportation were cut off, factories, offices and stores were shuttered, and processions, protests, chanting and marching crowded the streets of Dacca and other major cities. The Central Government in West Pakistan designated martial rule authorities to run East Pakistan, but the entire civil administration - including the High Court judges, the police, and the public officials of East Pakistan - refused to sit in on their duties. The prohibition was extended to civilian employees of the defence sites. Despite not having a legally recognised government, the AL enjoyed unwavering support from the public, government, and business community during the non-cooperation campaign. Consequently, Mujib had established a de facto administration in East Pakistan (‘Directive to Banks, Offices to Disburse Salaries', 1971). The army's and the central government's key decision makers and Bhutto had not expected the level of resistance (Sisson and Rose, 1990).   

The Pakistan army consolidated its power during that period, leading to several skirmishes between the army, protesters, and looters. On March 5, the Martial Law authorities decided to relocate the troops to the barracks, and the overall state of law and order changed. (‘Army Withdrawn to Barracks', 1971). In an address on March 6, 1971, Yahya blamed the AL for all the problems and made no mention of Bhutto, who was responsible for the impasse (Raghavan, 2013).  He said that the National Assembly meeting would then take place on March 25, 1971. On March 6, 1971, he replaced Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsan as Governor of East Pakistan with Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan (Rahman, 2009a).  

Mujib's Speech of 7 March 1971

The government immediately attempted to resume its planned political negotiations after announcing the assembly's postponement. During their lengthy phone chat on March 6, 1971, Mujib was advised by Yahya not to take an action from which there would be no way back (Choudhury, 2011). Later, at around midnight, Yahya sent Mujib a teleprinter message, which reached the Dacca headquarters under Martial Law. ‘Please do not make any hasty decisions. I'll be in Dacca soon to talk to you about the specifics. I've thought of a plan that will more than meet your six points.' it warned (Salik, 1977). A Brigadier personally delivered this message to Mujib's home in Dhanmondi. Since the military was not yet prepared to crush dissent in the East, Yahya's first priority was to prevent Mujib from declaring independence on his own. However, such a pronouncement would draw attention from around the world and might lead to some intervention (Raghavan, 2013). 

The Chief Martial Law Administrator's headquarters stepped in and ordered that Mujib's speech not be televised to the country. Salik informed the radio station of the directives. In response to the directive, the radio station's Bengali officers refused to work, and the station shut down. It restarted the next morning when it was allowed to play the tape of Mujib's speech (Salik, 1977). On March 6, the AL's working committee discussed the possibility of declaring independence. They came to the conclusion that the dictatorship was seeking a chance to use force to impose a solution. They also sought to keep up with the popular movement's pace. Therefore, rather than making a proclamation of independence, certain demands should be made, with independence being the ultimate objective (Rahman, 2009c). In his seventeen-minute statement, Mujib outlined four demands that he hoped Yahya would consider before addressing the National Assembly. These included: a. the immediate lifting of martial law; b. the military's immediate return to their barracks; c. a judicial investigation into the killings of the army in East Pakistan; and d. the prompt handover of authority to the people's elected representatives. A fifth demand was eventually added to these, that army units from West Pakistan stop being reinforced (Salik, 1977). Implementing the first, fourth, and fifth demands meant, to Yahya, his avaricious generals, and Bhutto, that they would have to concede defeat against the wishes of the people and Mujib. The AL's campaign against cooperation gained traction. A constant stream of processions wound through Dacca's streets throughout this time, typically coming to an end at Mujib's home (Salik, 1997).

The Talk in March 1971 

Finding a method to reconcile East Pakistan's demands with those of West Pakistan in order to create a single nation out of what were effectively two from the start was nearly impossible in mid-March 1971. Accordingly, Mujib and Yahya started their much-anticipated conversation on March 16, 1971 (Salik, 1997). General Peerzada, Justice Cornelius, Colonel Hasan of the Chief Martial Law Office in Rawalpindi and M. M. Ahmed, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission headed Yahya's team. In addition to that, the majority of the Pakistani army's top brass were in Dacca and met frequently at the city's military headquarters. Top party leaders Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Mustaq Ahmed, A. H. Qamruzzaman, Monsur Ali, and Dr. Kamal Hossain made up Mujib's negotiating team. Although they did not actively engage, several Bengali economists provided assistance to the team (Choudhury, 2011). 

Mujib formally promoted his four demands during the first day of meeting. Yahya suggested that Mujib would need to bring along the western majority party. Prior to draughting the constitution, he also maintained that there were legal distinctions in lifting Martial Law. Kamal Hossain proposed in a separate meeting that evening that Yahya could use the same order that he used to end Martial Law to issue an Interim Arrangements Order, which would essentially be a provincial constitution (Rahman, 2009c).  Following the meeting's second day on March 17, Mujib declared his intention to see the movement through to its ultimate triumph (Rahman, 2009a). During the meeting, Yahya told Mujib that he was dedicated to the handover of power. Yahya informed Tikka that same evening, ‘Get ready, the bastard [Mujib] is not behaving' (Salik, 1997). Tikka gave Major General Khadim Raja the command to proceed, which was seen as allowing for the beginning of army action preparation and paper presentation (Salik, 1997). Khadim Raja and Major General Rao Forman Ali later draughted the revised plan, ‘Operation Searchlight,' on March 18, 1971. On March 20, the army command authorised these orders with minor modifications, but no decision was made regarding their implementation. Three provisions were given great priority: the top AL leaders and anti-government student leaders were to be detained; East Pakistani military troops and police units were to be disarmed; and the AL and its sympathisers were to be treated as rebels (Sisson and Rose, 1990). On March 19, 1971, Mujib saw Yahya in the morning. Following the discussion, Mujib asked international reporters to remain by Bangladesh's plight and wait for updates on fresh developments (Rahman, 2009a). For the first time, on March 20, Mujib voiced his happiness by stating that they were moving towards a political settlement (Rahman, 2009a). However, Yahya expressed desire for political compromise. He proposed that the respective advisors may draft an interim constitution that embodied the four AL points as there were no compelling counterarguments. The main objectives of the agreement were: a. the lifting of martial law and the transfer of power to a civilian government through a presidential proclamation; b. the delegation of authority in the provinces of the majority party; c. the continuation of Yahya's presidency and control over the central government; and d. separate sessions of the East and West Pakistani members of the National Assembly in preparation for a joint session of the House to finalise the Constitution (Rahman, 2009b).

Only the time between the end of martial law and the Assembly's ratification of the new constitution was covered by the agreement. Rehman Sobhan claims that the entire plan was made to appease Bhutto, who was concerned that Mujib would form a coalition with other small political parties, particularly with regard to individual Assembly sessions (Rahman, 2009a). By March 20, 1971, the negotiations had advanced enough that Yahya summoned Bhutto to Dacca. Over the previous four days, Bhutto had been in communication with Yahya and Peerzada, and he had been upset at being left out of the conversation (Bhutto, 1971). 

There was clearly no common ground between Bhutto and Mujib. Bhutto demanded that: a. It would be wise to maintain martial law until the new constitution took effect; b. A majority of the members of each wing should have to accept a constitution before it can be presented to the National Assembly; c. According to the Legal Framework Order, the President should have the power to veto any constitution that the National Assembly approves (The International Commission of Jurists, 2017). In that way, Bhutto would get veto power for himself. Later, Bhutto recollected his stance as follows: 

Martial Law was the source of law then obtaining in Pakistan and the very basis of the President's authority; with the proclamation lifting Martial Law, the President and the Central Government would have lost their legal authority and sanction. There would be a vacuum unless the National Assembly was called into being establish a new source of sovereign power on the national level. If, in the absence of any such national source, power were transferred as proposed in the provinces, the government of each province could acquire de facto and de jure sovereign status (Bhutto, 1971).

Following a tripartite meeting with Bhutto and Mujib on March 22, the National Assembly session that was supposed to begin on March 25 was postponed by Yahya (‘National Assembly Session Put Off Again', 1971). Using placards, the general public demonstrated against Bhutto in front of the hotel. As the posters read, ‘No Pakistan, we want Bangladesh,' ‘No Integrity, we want independence,' and ‘Go back from Bangladesh,' the message to Bhutto and Yahya was obvious and unmistakable (Rahman, 2009 a). Pakistani constitutionalist attorney A. K. Brohi denied any legal challenge or obstacle to the transfer of power to the people on March 22. He used the Indian Independence Act of 1947 as an example in a written opinion (Rahman, 2009 a). In this regard, it should be noted that there were no concerns regarding the legality of Ayub's 1962 declaration of Martial Law lifting and introduction of a constitution (Choudhury, 2011). Yahya and his team concluded, following Brohi's legal opinion, that authority may be transferred by presidential proclamation in accordance with the Indian Independence Act of 1947 (Rahman, 2009 a).

The New Flag

Pakistan celebrated March 23 as ‘National Day.' The All India Muslim League's president, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, said that Muslims in India were a distinct community that needed their own territory and country on this day in 1940. March 23, 1971, was designated as ‘Resistance Day' in East Pakistan (Choudhury, 2011). On March 23, 1971, the image of the new national flag appeared in colour in all of Bangladesh's national publications. The new flag was raised on March 23 at hundreds of public and private structures, including the Soviet Consulate, the British High Commission, and every other location The Pakistani flag was raised by the embassies of China, Iran, Indonesia, and Nepal. There were no flags raised by the US Embassy (Rahman, 2009a). There were only two locations where the Pakistani flag was visible: Government House and the headquarters for Martial Law, Salik stated when describing the situation (1997).

Draft Proclamation of the Awami League

According to the Pakistan White Paper, which was released by the Pakistani government on August 5, 1971, representatives of the AL forwarded a draft proclamation to Yahya's advisors on March 23, 1971 (The International Commission of Jurists, 2017). Dr. Kamal Hossain prepared the text, which, according to G. M. Choudhury, was 26 typed pages long, started with a preamble, contained 18 articles with numerous subclauses and a long schedule, and was signed by Tajuddin Ahmed and other AL aides (Choudhury, 2011). Following the creation of the Constitutions of the States of West Pakistan and Bangla Desh, the President will call a meeting of the National Assembly, where all members will convene as a single, sovereign body to draft a Constitution for the Confederation of Pakistan, the AL's draft proclamation stated, according to the Pakistan White Paper (Government of Pakistan, 1971). Additionally, it was stated that during the interim, the East Pakistan Provincial Government and Legislature would have significantly expanded authority, including authority over foreign aid and trade, financial and taxation, and their own state bank (The International Commission of Jurists, 2017). The military leadership in Pakistan was no longer willing to make those compromises.

The AL's draft proclamation articulated their negotiating stance, which went beyond the Six Points and called for the creation of a confederation as opposed to a federation. The AL's specialists thought that Yahya's team's draft, which was sent the day before, was a shoddy attempt because their own draft aimed to be more thorough and accurate. On March 23, 1971, M. M. Ahmed was flown in specifically to draft the interregnum settlement and offered a list of three revisions. Those amendments were: a. The State Bank of Pakistan would have the authority to step in if there was a conflict in regional monetary policy, but the State Bank of Dacca would take up this responsibility for Bangladesh because it would take time for the chatters and the new reserve bank to form; b. The current agreements for funding the centre in revenue and foreign exchange remain in place; c. After funding was pledged at the consortium, the provinces may negotiate individual agreements on their own. A unified delegation for foreign help could, by agreement, be dominated by Bengalis and distributed according to a predetermined formula (Rahman, 2009a). At its meeting on March 24, 1971, the AL adopted the adjustments with a few minor wording changes in response to M. M. Ahmed's request. On some issues, however, disagreements remained. In any event, the AL team stated that when the presidential team considered these to be substantial changes, Mujib and Yahya could reach an agreement. There is no indication that the PPP rejected the economic policy arrangements, which were agreed upon by the government and the AL teams. Tajuddin Ahmed mentioned in this context on 17 April 1971 that it was important to note that General Yahya and his staff never broke down the negotiations or gave any hint that they had a final section that could not be abandoned (Rahman, 2009b).

The PPP and a number of senior army officers opposed alternative arrangements, mainly because they called for the removal of Martial Law and the transfer of power. The military feared ethnic split within its ranks and an insensitive government answerable to an antagonistic populace, while the PPP dreaded being shut out of power (Sisson and Rose, 1990). In addition, the government's oath in the Yahya draft placed more emphasis on sovereignty and state obligations, whilst the AL version placed more emphasis on constitutional obligations. Yahya called the heads of smaller West Pakistani parties on the evening of March 23. The leaders, aware that military intervention was imminent, urged Yahya to avoid taking any drastic measures and to free himself by handing over control to the elected officials. Unfortunately, military action was deemed necessary by Bhutto and his party officials. This message was conveyed to Yahya on the morning of 24 March (Sisson and Rose, 1990).     

On March 24, 1971, Bhutto declared that the talks were still going on, that they were progressing, and that he would stay in Dacca as long as it was required (Rahman, 2009a).  Bhutto's remark affirmed that the disputing parties had come to a basic understanding. In addition to Bhutto, Yahya's actions were not in doubt, and it is clear that he was only playing for time and had no intention of coming to a deal with the AL. 

Seeking the US Support Again

Alamgir visited the House of Blood during lunch on March 24 to inform him that Mujib and Yahya had come to an agreement on a solution that included the immediate establishment of provincial governments, the temporary constitution of the central government under President Yahya, the subsequent draughting of separate constitutions for the East and West, and an understanding that the interim arrangements and the eventual constitution would embody a division of power between the centre and the provinces, with the centre keeping only the authority for foreign affairs, currency, and defence. Mujib was concerned that Yahya may back out of the deal due to pressure from the military's hawks. Blood was told by Alamgir that Mujib believed the US would make Yahya more resolute by letting him know how much Washington supported a political solution (Blood, 2013). 

The Crackdown 

The leaders of the minority parties were notified early on March 24 that they would be departing for Karachi that afternoon on the final flight out (Sisson and Rose, 1990). Peerzada told the AL's negotiators during a meeting on the evening of March 24 that Mujib and Yahya could meet on the morning of March 25 and that Kamal Hossain would be notified by phone of the meeting's timing. However, Peerzada advised Cornelius that all West Pakistani officials in Dacca should depart the next day after the conference (Rahman, 2009c). 

While the AL leaders awaited a final conference to prepare the draft proclamation, Yahya left Dacca on the evening of March 25 after allowing the Pakistani army complete control to eradicate all Bengalis. After being warned over the phone that Yahya had departed Dacca and that the army was getting ready for a crackdown, Mujib refused to leave the house. He told an adviser who managed to avoid arrest, ‘If I go into hiding, they will burn the whole of Dacca to find me' (Rahman, 2009a). An estimated three battalions of infantry, artillery, and armoured soldiers participated in the attack of Dacca. The Army positioned itself at several strategic points and started to depart their barracks just before ten o'clock at night. The genocide against the unarmed Bengalis started just before midnight. This marked the beginning of the armed battle for Bangladesh's cause and independence from the Pakistani state, which was waging war on humanity in the sake of maintaining the unity of an Islamic Pakistan.

The 1970 election results in Pakistan shocked both party and government leaders, altering their expecta-tions for their respective roles in the discussions for a power transfer and the draughting of a constitution that would protect everyone's interests and alleviate their anxieties. This unexpected result made everyone rethink how to achieve their objectives in a setting where several parties had more influence than expected and where compromise and negotiation were less likely. Particularly high expectations were held by the PPP and the AL. In spite of its minority status in the National Assembly, the PPP began an effort to become one of Pakistan's two majority parties, tried to prevent the AL from forming alliances with western parties, and worked to undermine the AL's adherence to Pakistan's integrity and its constitutional ideals. The general populace realized that the civil-military bureaucracy that dominated Pakistan's sectarian structure would never acknowledge their rights. There was a lot of pressure on Mujib to pursue complete independence at the time. In his speech on March 7, 1971, Mujib expressed optimism about a political settlement despite the strong public support for independence. By mid-March, the AL had grown increasingly confrontational and belligerent, while the PPP had become politically isolated and reactive. The minor parties were settling on a strategy of backing the AL and were becoming more critical of Bhutto, but not of the PPP, therefore the PPP was not going to be actively involved in negotiations. The PPP was forceful and confrontational. The AL was reactive, and when the Six Points was attacked, it made a greater effort to strengthen its internal commitment to them in order to fend off external attempts to abort them. On the night of March 25, Yahya left Dacca in secret after giving the Pakistani army orders to slaughter the unarmed Bengalis, while the leaders of the AL waited for a final meeting to finalise the draft proclamation. The slender threads that held the country together were thus broken, and negotiations on a constitutional transition and a transfer of power had come to an end. 

Sincere gratitude is extended to all of the scholars whose work has been enhanced and advanced by their contributions and research efforts. This paper would not have been finished without the institutional support of Netrokona University, for which the author is also thankful. 

The author declares no conflicts of interest